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Abstract
Prior studies have revealed that foreign shareholders have a greater influence 
on dividend policy. However, it is unclear how foreign owners in large firms 
affect the propensity to pay dividends. This paper is aimed at exploring the 
relationship between the propensity to pay dividends and foreign ownership. 
It also examined the moderating role of firm size on the relationship between 
the decision to pay cash dividend and foreign ownership. The study uses 
pooled logistic regression on a data set of non-financial listed firms on the 
Nigerian Stock Market from 2011 to 2015. The results showed that foreign 
ownership has a great tendency to influence the propensity of a firm to 
pay a cash dividend. The effect is more pronounced in larger firms, thus, 
indicating that in larger firms, foreign owners mitigate agency problems 
using dividends. Based on the findings, firms should be encouraged to pay 
a dividend to attract foreign investors and in return will help the firms to 
acquire the expertise of foreign owners.
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Introduction
Dividend policy is one of the most debated topics in the field of finance. 
This is because of its sensitivity to several factors, like firm and market-
specific characteristics. According to Baker and Weigand (2015), solving 
the dividend puzzle has now become an even more challenging phenomenon 
because every firm and market have peculiar characteristics and various 
possible forms of dividends substitutes. More recently, Tanveer and Jamil 
(2019) also stated that a dividend is very vital as firms continue to make 
its payments despite the difficulties faced by financial economists in their 
analyses. In addition to the size and form of dividends that a firm is expected 
to pay, managers first need to consider the likely factors that will necessitate 
its payment. Such factors may include ownership structure prevailing in the 
firm, its size, indebtedness, and maturity, among others. 
The monitoring activities of foreign investors may be higher than those of 
domestic investors. Also, foreign investors may be less inclined to a dividend 
and are usually institutional investors from developed markets. Based on this 
assertion, Jeon and Ryoo (2013) argued that foreign owners are expected 
to maintain worldwide standards and best corporate governance practices. 
Furthermore, the foreign owners have stronger monitoring incentives and 
provide a greater control mechanism given the nature of their investments 
(large stakes and long-term investment style). In this regard, this current 
paper argues that foreign ownership, which is one form of ownership 
structure, could be a significant contributor to the financial policies of a firm. 
One of these policies is a firm’s dividend payout. Foreign owners may use a 
dividend as a tool for controlling agency-related problems. 
Before foreign owners invest their resources in any firm traded in an exchange 
market or otherwise, they must first carry out an analysis of such firm that 
include its size, corporate governance practices, financial performance and 
payout policies to mention but few. Prior works have indicated the significant 
effect of foreign owners on cash dividend. They include Nigeria (Abdulkadir, 
Abdullah & Wong, 2016), Australia (Henry, 2011), Spain (Pucheta-Martínez 
& López-Zamora, 2017), Korea (Jeon, Lee & Moffett, 2011), China (Lam, 
Sami & Zhou, 2012) and Jordan (Obaidat, 2018).
This paper uses a data sample of public listed non-financial firms in Nigeria 
from 2011-2015. The study chose the Nigerian market because of the distinct 
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features that prevail in the market. First, there has been a decline in dividend 
payments in Nigeria. Only 124 of the 212 listed firms (58%) paid dividends 
from 2011 to 2016, and only 33 percent of the payers were large capitalised 
firms (Awoyemi & Bagga, 2016; NSE, 2016). Hence, this may lead to greater 
agency problems. 
Nonetheless, this situation may provide a good avenue to examine the effect 
of firm size on the relationship between foreign ownership and the propensity 
to pay a dividend. First, the size of a firm is an important feature of a firm that 
may determine whether to pay a dividend in Nigeria (Abdulkadir, Abdullah 
& Woei-Chyuan, 2015). Second, the Nigerian market is viewed as a foreign-
investor driven market. According to Abdulkadir et al. (2015), foreign 
investors have dominated, as they account for 61.4 percent ownership across 
firms. The dominance is the result of the existing Nigerian corporate law that 
warrants foreign owners to hold up to  100 percent stake in any sector of the 
economy except for the oil and gas sector. Moreover, foreign participation in 
the NSE has continued to increase. For instance, 808 Billion Naira in 2012, 
1,042 Billion Naira in 2013 and 1,539 Billion Naira in 2014 as compared to 
509; 1,009; 1,137 Billion Naira for domestic participation in 2012, 2013 and 
2014 respectively (NSE, 2015). Therefore, this may have a considerable effect 
on the dividend policy of the affected companies. Third, Nigerian company 
laws emanate from English law and as such are expected to be stronger in 
terms of shareholders protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 2000). However, this remains an illusion because the enforcement of 
the existing laws, regulations and implementation of corporate governance 
constitutes a major challenge (Okpara, 2011). 
However, evidence on how foreign ownership impacts on cash dividends in 
larger firms remains scanty and unclear. This paper addressed this gap by 
examining the influential role of foreign ownership on the propensity to pay 
dividends in larger firms. This paper used a data sample of public listed non-
financial firms in Nigeria from 2011-2015 with a final sample of 431 firm-year 
observations. The findings from the current study show that the association 
between foreign ownership and the propensity to pay dividends in large firms 
is positive and statistically Furthermore, with the introduction of firm size as 
a moderating variable, the result persists and becomes more positive, thus, 
suggesting that in larger firms, foreign investors are likely to use dividends 
to mitigate agency problem. The results findings contradicted the finding of 
(Abdulkadir et al., 2016) that documented a negative relationship between 
foreign ownership and (Lam et al., 2012).
This paper contributes to the dividend policy literature in the following ways. 
First, the paper examines how foreign ownership affects the propensity 
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to pay dividends from one of the largest economies in the West African 
market. Second, the study adds to the literature by testing the moderating 
effect of size of the firm on the relationship between foreign ownership and 
the propensity to pay dividends thus suggesting that in larger firms where 
agency problems prevail, foreign investors may use dividend as a tool for 
controlling of managers’ perquisite consumption. The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows: Section two discusses relevant literature and hypothesis 
development. The methodology is discussed in section three, while section 
four discusses the findings and the last section concludes the study. 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Prior studies have attempted to link the dividend policy puzzle to various 
theories. One of them is agency theory. This theory posits that a conflict 
of interest exists between managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Shareholders who happen to be outside investors tend to benefit less 
from the capital they have invested in the firm because the managers prefer 
to maintain the cash or use it for perquisite consumption (Cao, Du & Ørding, 
2017). A dividend payment remedies the agency conflict associated with 
squandering of the available free cash flow in the firms (Easterbrook, 1984; 
Jensen, 1986). 
Because managers prefer to maintain the cash in the firm, a need exists to 
have someone more powerful than the managers who will ensure that the 
cash is returned to the shareholders in the form of a dividend. To actualise 
this goal, well-informed investors are required who can induce the managers 
to pay dividends. Amongst these investors are foreign owners. Jeon and 
Ryoo (2013) posited that foreign owners are usually sophisticated investors 
and maintain worldwide standards and best corporate governance practices. 
This type of investor typically has considerable shareholdings and the 
requisite knowledge and ability to carefully monitor the managers (Cao et 
al., 2017). Based on these facts, the expectation is that their incentive to 
monitor managers could be higher compare to other investors with a more 
limited shareholding. In this regard, the foreign owners may have all channels 
of communication to the managers being opened to them and, therefore, 
encourage the managers to disburse free cash flow as a dividend. Sometimes, 
foreign owners may use multiple “carrot and stick” approaches or strategy 
to pressure powerful managers who have higher tendencies to exacerbate 
agency problems. As a result of such pressure by the foreign owners, these 
managers might reconsider their cash retention strategy force to disgorge 
a cash dividend to the shareholders. Florackis (2008) opined that financial 
carrots are a motivating factor that aligns the interests of the managers with 
those of the shareholders and, hence, mitigates the agency problems. 
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Foreign Ownership and Propensity to pay Dividends
Conflicting results have been reported on the relationship between foreign 
ownership and dividend policy. According to Abdulkadir et al. (2016), a 
negative and statistically significant relationship existed between foreign 
ownership and the dividend payout decisions of the listed Nigerian firms 
during the period 2003-2012. Their finding suggests that firms are less likely 
to pay cash dividend as foreign shareholding is high. The result may be 
attributed to the tax imposed on dividend income. The country charges a 
withholding tax of 10% on dividend income whether the investor is foreign or 
domestic. Nevertheless, Jeon et al. (2011) found support for the preferences 
for dividends by foreign investors. Their study documented a positive and 
significant correlation between foreign ownership and the propensity to pay 
dividends in Korean markets. The study suggested that foreign shareholders 
have a strong incentive to monitor management in firms given their large 
holdings and investment styles. This finding also aligns with Cao et al. 
(2017), Hwang, Kim, Park and Park (2013), Obaidat (2018), and Pucheta-
Martínez and López-Zamora (2017) that the dividend paid becomes higher 
as the holdings of foreign investors increase. More recently, Bista, Bartaula, 
Shrestha, Gnawali, Lamichhane and Parajuli (2019) and Christopher and 
Chalid (2019) documented that foreign owners have positive effect on 
dividend policy in Nepalese and Indonesian firms respectively. These results 
supported the agency theory view of dividends. Consistent with these results 
and in support of the agency theory, the following hypothesis is posited. 
H1:  There is a positive association between foreign ownership and the 
propensity to pay dividends.
Prior literature suggested the importance of firm size. Farinha (2003) argued 
that the size of the firm could be used as a proxy for agency costs. Larger firms 
are expected to have higher agency costs than smaller ones (Christopher & 
Chalid, 2019). Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) posited that managers 
have greater control in larger firms and in which ownership is dispersed such 
that shareholders have less incentive and ability to assume the monitoring 
activities. Thus, the level of agency problems and information asymmetry 
deepens. Also, evidence indicated that firm size is positively related to the 
propensity to pay a dividend (Abdulkadir et al., 2016; Fama & French, 2001). 
Thus, including firm size as a moderating variable may provide an insight as 
to how foreign owners influence the propensity to pay dividends in larger 
firms. Thus, the following hypothesis is posited.
H2:  Firm size positively moderates the association between foreign 
ownership and propensity to pay dividends.
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Methodology
This study uses secondary sources of data and pooled logistic regression to 
test the predictions. Consistent with the literature (Baker, Dutta & Saadi, 
2008; Saeed & Sameer, 2017), the study utilised non-financial listed firms 
from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The sampling period is five years 
that covers a period between 2011 and 2015, with a total of 445 firm-year 
observations. Fourteen observations were dropped to minimise the effect 
of outliers in the sample. The final sample of the study was 431 firm-year 
observation. The selection of the period was related to the decline in the 
dividend payments in the exchange (Abdulkadir et al., 2016). Besides, there 
was a surge in the foreign portfolio during the period of study (NSE, 2015). 
The data were extracted from the annual reports of the listed firms.
Variable Measurement
Dependent variable
This study followed prior studies on the propensity to pay dividends (Al-
Najjar & Kilincarslan, 2016; Arko, Abor, Adjasi & Amidu, 2014; Idris, Ishak 
& Hassan, 2019) to model the dependent variable. The dependent variable 
was a binary variable, which was coded as 1 if a company paid a dividend 
and 0 if otherwise during the period of study. 
Independent variables
The independent variable of this study was foreign ownership. Foreign 
ownership is measured as the proportion of shares held by foreign investors 
to the total number of shares in issue and is in line with Jeon et al. (2011) and 
Min and Bowman (2015). Firm size is FZE used as a moderating variable and 
represents the total assets of the firm (Farooq & Ahmed, 2019). The dummy 
variable equalled 1 if the total assets were above the median value and 0 if 
otherwise. Prior evidence has shown that size of the firm is an important 
determinant of dividend policy decision. For instance, Fama and French 
(2001), Fatemi and Bildik (2012), and Hu and Kumar (2004) have affirmed 
that the likelihood of dividend payout depends on the size of the firm. 
Control variables
Consistent with the literature on the propensity to pay dividends, this study 
uses four control variables that include firm leverage (LEV), sales growth 
(SGW) and retained profits (RET). FAGE is the number of years the firm 
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has been listed on the stock exchange (Hu & Kumar, 2004). LEV represents 
the total debt divided by total assets (Francis, Hasan, John & Song, 2011). 
SGW is measured by current sales less previous sales divided by previous 
sales (Ferris, Jayaraman & Sabherwal, 2009) RET is retained earnings scaled 
by total capital (Francis et al., 2011). BCM is board composition and is the 
proportion of outside directors on board and BSZ is board size and is the 
total number of executive and non-executive directors on board (Idris, Ishak 
& Hassan, 2017).  Below are the two models used for the study. Model (1) is 
the direct model while model (2) is the interaction model:
PRD
i
  = β0 + β1FOSi + β2LEVi + β3SGWi + β4RETi+ β5 BCMi + β6 BSZi+ ei      (1)
PRD
i
 = β0 + β1FOSi + β2FSZi+ β3FOR*FSZi + β4LEVi + β5SGWi + 
             β6RETi + β7BCMi + β8BSZi +ei         (2)
Where:
PRD = Propensity to pay dividends
FOS = foreign ownership
LEV = Firm leverage
FSZ = Firm size
SGW = Sales growth
RET = Retained earnings
BCM = Board composition
BSZ = Board size  
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. 
On the average, 50.6 percent of the sample firms paid cash dividends to 
their shareholders. The mean value of the dividend payers was lower when 
compared with what other markets have reported. For example, Francis et 
al. (2011) reported 52.4 percent for US market and Pucheta-Martínez and 
López-Zamora (2017) reported 55.76 percent for the Spanish market and 
higher than those that Saeed and Sameer (2017) reported for emerging 
markets (25.2%) and Al-Najjar and  Kilincarslan (2016) reported for Turkish 
market (33.9%). The mean value of foreign ownership (FOS) was 56.4 
percent. The mean was higher compared to prior studies like Abdulkadir et 
al. (2016) who reported 52.4 percent for the Nigerian market, and Cao et al., 
(2017) who reported 16.7 percent for the Chinese market.
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Table 1 provides the result of the correlation matrix to test for multicollinearity. 
The correlation matrix between the pairs was relatively low and was below 
0.4. None of the correlation coefficients was greater than 0.6, which may 
indicate multicollinearity concerns. Therefore, the models may not suffer 
from multicollinearity issues. The variables of interest in this correlation 
matrix were foreign ownership (FOS) and firm size (FSZ). As can be seen, 
PRD was positively related to FOS (r=0.197) and FSZ (0.569). The sign of 
the correlation coefficient of the matrix may suggest the probable direction 
of the dependent and independent variable in the main regression equation.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of dividend and non-dividend paying 
firms. As can be seen from the table, dividends paying firms have a higher 
percentage of foreign owners and are larger firms compared with non-
dividend paying firms. The data reveal a statistically significant difference 
between dividend and non-dividend paying firm at 1 percent. The result may 
yield as insight on presence as well as their effect on dividend-paying firms.
Table 2
Univariate Comparison of Dividend-Paying and Non-Dividend Paying 
Firms
Dividend-Paying firms. N=218 Non-Dividend Paying firms. N =213
Variables Mean SD Mean SD T-stat.
FOS 0.661 0.475 0.465 0.500 -19.57***
FSZ 0.780 0.415 0.211 0.409 -56.85***
LEV 0.549 0.179 0.544 0.231 -0.46
SGW 0.276 0.173 -0.024 0.369 -29.97***
RET 0.567 0.176 0.543 0.211 -2.38
BCM 0.696 0.121 0.691 0.126 -0.42
BSZ 9.234 2.091 8.000 2.030 -123.39***
Note: PRD = Propensity to pay dividend; FOS = Foreign ownership; FSZ = Firm 
size; LEV = Leverage; SGW = sales growth; RET = Retained profit; BCM = Board 
composition; BSZ = Board size. *** p<0.01.
Regression Analysis
Table 3 shows the results of the pooled logit regression for the direct and 
interaction models. As presented, two models are built for the dependent 
variable PRD that takes the value of one or zero. Column 1 presents the 
result of the direct relationship between foreign ownership and propensity 
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to pay dividends. Column 2 is the result of the average marginal effect of 
the direct model for every variable in our study. The effect of firm size on 
the relationship between propensity to pay a dividend and foreign ownership 
along with its marginal effect, are presented in columns 3 and 4, respectively.
Furthermore, the results of large and small firms in terms of their total assets 
are shown in columns 5 to 8, along with their marginal effects. Marginal 
effect is used to provide further economic significance of the variables. This 
is because coefficients estimated in logit regression do not provide a direct 
economic interpretation of the explanatory variables (Manos, Murinde & 
Green, 2012). Hence, this study adopted average marginal effects to interpret 
economic significance.  
The variable of interest here is foreign ownership. The findings from model 
1 in column 1 lend support to hypothesis 1. The result of the association 
between foreign ownership and propensity to pay dividends was positive 
and statistically significant. The average marginal effects confirm this result. 
All things being equal and on the average, a one-unit increase in the holdings 
of foreign investors will lead to an increase of 21.1% in the propensity to 
pay dividends among the listed firms on the NSE. This result agrees with 
previous evidence (Bista et al., 2019; Cao et al., 2017; Christopher & Chalid, 
2019; Hwang et al., 2013). 
The result reported in Table 3 columns 3 to 4 shows that firm size positively 
moderates the relationship between foreign ownership and propensity to pay 
dividends. The coefficient of the interaction term (FOR*FSZ) is positive and 
statistically significant. Moreover, the economic significance of this term 
suggests that on the average, in larger firms, the presence of foreign owners 
will approximately result in a 35.50% increase in the likelihood of dividends 
paid. This result is in line with the hypothesis and aligns with previous studies 
(Cao et al., 2017; Hwang et al., 2013; Obaidat, 2018; Pucheta-Martínez & 
López-Zamora, 2017). This suggests that in larger firms, foreign owners may 
tend to push for cash dividend payment and, hence, be willing to alleviate the 
agency conflict using dividend at the expense of tax. In other words, foreign 
owners consider eradicating an agency conflict as a matter of preference 
rather than capital gain due to the tax effect. Previous evidence argued that 
the prevalence of agency conflict was more pronounced in larger firms than 
in small firms (Farinha, 2003). Furthermore, larger firms are more mature 
and tend to have easier access to the capital markets, which reduces their 
dependence on internally generated funding (Fama & French, 2001; Fatemi 
& Bildik, 2012; Ferris, Sen & Yui, 2006). This allows them to pay more 
cash dividends. The intensity of agency conflict and information asymmetry 
becomes greater in large firms since shareholders have less incentive in 
monitoring the managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
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Furthermore, the result of the analysis in this study is revealing. In columns 
5 to 8, both the coefficient and marginal effect of foreign owners in larger 
firms were positive and statistically significant. This result conforms with the 
hypothesis that foreign investors in larger firms are more likely to influence 
the propensity to pay dividends and, hence, the findings are in conformity 
with agency theory. 
Consequently, Table 3 shows the results of five control variables used in the 
study. Leverage, sales growth, and board size were positive and statistically 
significant. The result indicates that an indebted firm in the NSE has a 
higher likelihood of paying a cash dividend. The finding failed to agree 
with a prior expectation. With regards to sales growth, the result supports 
the prior evidence of Arko, Abor, Adjasi and Amidu (2014) that growth 
firms in Nigeria and South Africa found it necessary to pay dividends to 
make their shares in the capital market. The last control variable that was 
significant in this study was board size. The result reveals that a larger board 
was associated with a higher tendency to pay a cash dividend. This finding 
agrees with the agency theory and prior studies (Al-Najjar & Kilincarslan, 
2016; Idris et al., 2017). 
Robustness Tests
This section provides robustness checks of the main findings of the study. 
First, the study checked for the sensitivity of the results shown in Tables 
4 and 5. First, a dummy variable “1” was used if there were foreign owner 
in the firm in a year and “0” if otherwise. Then, the two models (direct and 
interaction model) were rerun. Table 4 presents the results (coefficient and 
marginal effects). The variable of interest in the two models in columns 1 and 
3 remain positive and statistically significant. Thus, foreign owners influence 
the propensity to pay dividends. 
Second,  following Cao et al. (2017), foreign ownership was used as a 
dummy variable. High foreign was “1” if the percentage of foreign ownership 
holding was higher than the sample median and “0” if otherwise as an 
alternative measure of the independent variable. Second, a dummy variable 
of foreign ownership of “1” was used if a firm had foreign investors and 
“0” if otherwise. Table 5 presents the result. The results of these analyses 
remain intact, as previously reported in the main results. Thus, the findings 
are robust and are not sensitive to the change of the independent variable 
measurements. 
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Table 4
Regression Results for High and Low Foreign Ownership











FOS 0.821*** 0.138*** -0.190 -0.023






LEV 1.173* 0.197* -1.266 -0.155
(0.629) (0.105) (0.779) (0.094)
SGW 4.419*** 0.744*** 5.768*** 0.706***
(0.571) (0.070) (0.865) (0.082)
RET 0.216 0.036 -0.652 -0.080
(0.618) (0.104) (0.768) (0.094)
BCM -0.748 -0.126 0.269 0.033
(1.096) (0.183) (1.163) (0.142)
BSZ 0.310*** 0.052*** 0.190*** 0.023***
(0.0635) (0.010) (0.0672) (0.008)
Constant -3.967*** - -3.200*** -
(1.011) - (1.173) -
Wald chi2 101.92*** - 111.81*** -
Pseudo R2 0.2724 - 0.4491 -
Observations 431 431 431 431
Notes: PRD = Propensity to pay dividend; FOS = Foreign ownership; FSZ = Firm 
size; LEV = Leverage; SGW = sales growth; RET = Retained profit; BCM = Board 
composition; Board size. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses .*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
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Notes: PRD = Propensity to pay dividend; FOS = Foreign ownership; FSZ = Firm 
size; LEV = Leverage; SGW = sales growth; RET = Retained profit; BCM = Board 
composition; Board size. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses .*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
Conclusions
The paper examined the relationship between the propensity to pay dividends 
and foreign ownership. It also tested the effect of firm size as a moderating 
variable on the relationship between the propensity to pay dividends and 
foreign ownership in the context of agency theory. The empirical analysis 
revealed that foreign owners have a significant impact on influencing the 
payment of a cash dividend. Their effect is even more pronounced in larger 
firms. Therefore, the results support the claim of this study that the size of a 
firm moderates the relationship between foreign owners and the propensity 
to pay dividends. Overall, the findings indicated that foreign owners are 
important determiners of the likelihood of cash dividends. Hence, the study 
adds to the existing literature on agency theory.
The findings of this study have some policy implications. Firms should be 
encouraged to pay a dividend to attract foreign investors. This will, in turn, 
help the firms to acquire the expertise of foreign owners because they are 
more likely to possess critical knowledge that will enhance the performance 
of the firm. Moreover, the government should also reconsider its taxation 
policy on foreign owners by downward scaling of the rate. Thus, this will 
encourage the inflow of foreign investors in the NSE market and will allow 
the management to continue to pay dividends because paying them may be 
more beneficial to existing shareholders, particularly the foreign investors. 
Based on the findings of this study, future study may consider the following, 
firstly to expanding the sample size and period to include more companies 
and years. Secondly, future studies may also consider analysing the identity 
of the foreign owners and the use of other agency theory related variables 
apart from the size of the firm as a moderator. Thirdly, examining some 
exchange markets in the sub-Saharan African and lastly, it would be 
interesting if financial firms were examined distinctively. 
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